Cross-modal iconicity: A cognitive semiotic approach to sound symbolism by Ahlner, Felix & Zlatev, Jordan
Sign Systems Studies 38(1/4), 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-modal iconicity:  
A cognitive semiotic approach to sound symbolism 
Felix Ahlner, Jordan Zlatev 
Centre for Languages and Literature, Lund University 
Box 201, 221 00, Lund, Sweden 
e-mail: felix.ahlner@gmail.com, jordan.zlatev@ling.lu.se 
 
Abstract. It is being increasingly recognized that the Saussurean dictum of “the 
arbitrariness of the linguistic sign” is in conflict with the pervasiveness of the 
phenomenon commonly known as “sound symbolism”. After first presenting a 
historical overview of the debate, however, we conclude that both positions have 
been exaggerated, and that an adequate explanation of sound symbolism is still 
lacking. How can there, for example, be (perceived) similarity between expressions 
and contents across different sensory modalities? We offer an answer, based on 
the Peircian notion of iconic ground, and G. Sonesson’s distinction between 
primary and secondary iconicity. Furthermore, we describe an experimental study, 
in a paradigm first pioneered by W. Köhler, and recently popularized by V. 
Ramachandran, in which we varied vowels and consonants in fictive word-forms, 
and conclude that both types of sounds play a role in perceiving an iconic ground 
between the word-forms and visual figures. The combination of historical 
conceptual analysis, semiotic explication and psychological experimentation 
presented in this article is characteristic of the emerging paradigm of cognitive 
semiotics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Is the relationship between the expression and content poles of the 
linguistic sign fundamentally arbitrary, as it is typically claimed, 
following the famous dictum of the “father of modern linguistics” (see 
Lyons 1968), Ferdinand de Saussure, or is there some kind of ‘natural 
connection’ between the two? This question dates back to antiquity, 
but — we would claim — is still not satisfactorily resolved. Even the 
most committed proponents of the arbitrariness dictum recognize the 
existence of onomatopoetic words, but tend to regard these as 
‘primitive curiosities’, existing outside and alongside the language 
system proper. The alternative viewpoint, commonly known as ‘sound 
symbolism’ (Hinton et al. 1994), has gained ground during the last few 
decades. For example, a result that has been replicated a number of 
times is that when both adults and children (without autism) are given 
two fictive words like bouba and kiki and asked to decide which one 
denotes a roundish and which a pointy figure, they agree up to 95% 
that bouba suits best the roundish one (for example, Ramachandran, 
Hubbard 2001). How are we to explain this, and is it possible to find a 
dialectical synthesis that could help resolve the debate between 
‘arbitrariness’ and ‘sound symbolism’? This is the main question that 
we address in this article.  
We proceed in three steps. First, we present a historical and 
theoretical overview of the debate, involving theoretical positions in 
linguistics and semiotics, and relate these to relevant empirical 
findings. This review shows surprising conceptual shortcomings in the 
discussion, including vague and inconsistent definitions of key terms 
such as ‘arbitrariness’, ‘sound symbolism’ and ‘iconicity’. Hence, in a 
second step we endeavor to present a consistent semiotic analysis of 
the (possible) relation of resemblance between linguistic sound 
patterns and the objects that they denote, allowing us to make sense of 
results such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph. Such 
exercises of conceptual analysis and explication are necessary, but not 
Felix Ahlner, Jordan Zlatev  300
sufficient to understand the phenomenon in detail. Therefore, in the 
spirit of the emerging paradigm of cognitive semiotics (see Zlatev 
2009), “integrating methods and theories developed in the disciplines 
of cognitive science with methods and theories developed in semiotics 
and the humanities”1, we turn in our third step to the description of a 
psychological experiment aiming to decide whether the relevant 
(cross-modal) similarity between linguistic expression and content is 
found at the level of segments (vowels and consonants) or in the 
combination of segments, and possibly in whole “sound patterns”. 
While by no means claiming that this three-step exercise will 
provide the ‘resolution’ to the age-old debate, we will suggest that it 
casts it in a partially new light, with the potential for a synthesis 
between (aspects of) positions that have been usually regarded as 
incommensurable: the conventionality and motivatedness of lexical 
meaning. We will conclude by suggesting how our analysis, and in 
particular the notion of cross-modal iconicity, can be productive for 
future research. 
 
 
2. Historical and theoretical background 
 
2.1. Ancient Greece 
 
As many ‘big questions’ in Western thought, the debate between the 
proponents of linguistic ‘conventionalism’ vs. ‘naturalism’ goes back to 
ancient Greece. In fact, language was not the primary focus of the 
ancients. The laws of society had for a long time been regarded as 
immutable and natural, but if they could be regarded as determined by 
convention, they could be questioned and debated, which was 
fundamental for the idea of democracy (see Lyons 1968; De Cuypere 
2008). Since language, in the form of public discourse, constituted the 
                                                 
1  www.cognitivesemiotics.com 
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means through which these discussions were carried out, it was 
inevitable that the debate would also come to involve the proper 
understanding of its essence. 
Plato’s famous dialogue Cratylus, from around 400 BC, is the 
principle reference for this early debate.2 The two main stances that 
had developed up to that time were that language is either given by 
nature (phýsei) or by convention (thései). In the dialogue, these are 
represented by Cratylus and Hermogenes, respectively.3 The former 
argues that a word’s sound-form is somehow ‘naturally’ connected to 
its meaning. Therefore, a particular sound-pattern can be deemed 
more or less appropriate for expressing a particular meaning. The 
latter argues that words are man-created and passed on through 
generations, thus constituting the core of a conventional system of 
communication: language. As a supporter of phýsei, Cratylus presents 
examples of how certain sounds are better suited for certain meanings, 
since the movements of the tongue and mouth ‘imitate’ or resemble 
what the word means. For example, [r] is said to naturally express 
‘rapidity’ and ‘motion’, and [o] ‘roundness’. The proposed sound-
meaning resemblances are then exemplified by ‘appropriate’ words, 
such as góngylon (‘round’). Hermogenes then contests this by giving 
examples of words containing the same sounds, but whose meaning is 
quite different. In the end of the dialogue, the two debaters find 
themselves in a stalemate; some sound forms seem indeed to ‘re-
semble’ their meanings, while many others do not. They also agree 
that “in order to gain knowledge of reality […] one should study 
reality as such, instead of taking recourse to the study of language.” 
(De Cuypere 2008: 14f) 
Albeit far removed from the concerns of modern linguistics and 
semiotics, Cratylus shows that the basic positions of the nature-
                                                 
2  See Sedley (2003) for a recent comprehensive monograph on Cratylus. 
3  Cratylus and Hermogenes were historical persons, but the opinions expressed 
in the dialogue were ascribed to them by Plato. 
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convention debate were set early in Western thought. Several other 
characteristics also seem to have lived on during the centuries. Firstly, 
we can note the vague terms in which the phýsei position tends to be 
presented (‘natural connection’, ‘imitation’). Secondly, the conventio-
nality of sound-meaning pairings tends to be construed as an anti-
thesis to there being any substantial resemblance (or other motivated 
relation) involved; the step from here to ‘arbitrariness’ is small. In fact, 
conventionality and motivatedness are far from antithetical. We 
return to this below, but let us here only mention the fact that 
approximately half of the signs of American Sign Language, which is 
undoubtedly a conventional semiotic system, are judged to be iconic, 
that is, their shapes resemble their meanings (Woll, Kyle 2004). 
Thirdly, the dialogue’s non-conclusive outcome has become a 
recurrent theme; given the extremeness of the positions, combined 
with vague formulations it is hard to see how it could have been 
otherwise. 
 
 
2.2. Saussure, structuralism and ‘the arbitrariness  
of the linguistic sign’ 
 
As a key representative of both linguistic structuralism and semiotics, 
Ferdinand de Saussure strived to move away from a ‘nomenclatural’ 
view of language, according to which words are attached to things and 
ideas that exist independently of language and human thought. 
Instead, the linguistic sign was claimed to involve “not a link between 
a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern” 
(Saussure 1959[1916]: 66).4 The linguistic sign thus constitutes one 
                                                 
4  As well-known, Saussure’s most famous publication Cours de linguistique 
générale, derives from his students’ lecture notes based on Saussure’s lectures at 
the University of Geneva 1906–1911. Current research shows that these may have 
misrepresented his thinking in various respects (Bouissac 2010). 
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“psychological entity” whose two parts are intimately conjoined and 
mutually dependent, each automatically evoking the other. 
Saussure claimed that the “primordial principle” of the linguistic 
sign is its arbitrariness. By this, he meant that a sound pattern and a 
concept have no “natural connection” that motivates them to be 
linked together in a linguistic sign. This is to be shown by observing 
that sound-concept links differ between languages, for example, the 
concept HORSE is linked to the sound patterns [hɔːɹs] in English, 
[ʃəval] in French, and [kuːɲ] in Czech. Neither sound pattern seems to 
have any inherent ‘equine’ qualities. Saussure concluded: “Because the 
sign is arbitrary, it follows no law other than that of tradition, and 
because it is based on tradition, it is arbitrary” (Saussure 1959[1916]: 
74). One may wonder about the validity of the second sentence: does 
cultural transmission (‘tradition’) necessarily imply arbitrariness? The 
conflation of the features ‘conventionality’ and ‘arbitrariness’ when it 
comes to linguistic signs has been commonplace, both before and after 
Saussure,5 but this hardly guarantees its correctness. 
Another basic tenet of structuralism was that signs are delimited 
and defined by their contrast with other signs in the specific language 
system. Saussure (1959[1916]: 115f) mentions how the English word 
sheep and the French mouton may have the same signification, but 
whereas sheep contrasts with mutton in English, in French mouton can 
denote both the living animal and its meat; hence sheep and mouton 
have different meanings. Such language-specific ‘structure’, even more 
prominent in grammar than in lexical semantics is indeed an 
important characteristic of human languages. But is it also ‘arbitrary’? 
Saussure, and many in his footsteps seemed to believe so — but on 
what ground? Finally, Saussure acknowledged the existence of 
onomatopoetic words which seemed to contradict the principle of 
                                                 
5  Compare: “Every existing form of human speech is a body of arbitrary and 
conventional signs for thought, handed down by tradition from one generation to 
another” (Whitney 1867: 32). 
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arbitrariness, but downplayed their role by stating that “such words 
are never organic elements of a linguistic system. […] Moreover, they 
are far fewer than is generally believed” (Saussure 1959[1916]: 69f). 
Over the course of the 20th century, counterarguments from 
linguistic functionalists, based on a wealth of linguistic evidence, have 
made many of these claims difficult to maintain. However, before 
turning to these, it is important to remember that Saussure’s point of 
view was in line with the linguistic consensus of the time. In 19th 
century Europe, linguistics as a field was to a large extent occupied 
with comparisons and reconstructions within the Indo-European 
language family. An exaggerated belief in the methods of comparative 
linguistics led linguists to believe that, through the application of 
sound changes, human language could be traced back to its very origin. 
In this pursuit, onomatopoeia was considered too crude to have been 
able to give rise to the number and variety of related word roots existing 
across the Indo-European languages. Max Müller called onomatopoeia 
a “chaotic anarchy”, and in his popular Lectures on the Science of 
Language he wrote that “[the] onomatopœic system would be most 
detrimental to all scientific etymology and no amount of learning and 
ingenuity displayed in its application could atone for the lawlessness 
which is sanctioned by it” (Müller 1864: 94). The historical changes 
under study were “the true natural growth of words”, whereas 
onomatopoetic words were “[…] artificial flowers, without a root. They 
are sterile, and are unfit to express anything beyond the one object 
which they imitate” (Müller 1869: 361). Whitney drew the concise 
conclusion that “[there is no inner or] essential connection between idea 
and word […] in any language upon earth” (Whitney 1867: 32). 
Not only did research focus almost exclusively on Indo-European 
languages, many also considered these to be superior to other 
languages. Inflecting languages such as Greek, German, Latin and 
Sanskrit were thought to be the best tools for expressing human 
thought, and they were thus placed on the highest stage of linguistic 
development (see Losonsky 1999). As an example, Crowther’s gram-
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mar of Yoruba deemed the lack of inflection in the Yoruba verb a 
“negative character” (Crowther 1852: 12). Joh. Bernhard Schlegel 
made an important contribution in his description of the Kwa 
language Ewe, but at the same time he noted that the language “still 
finds itself in an initial stage”.6 
These mutually reinforcing ideas led to what perhaps was the main 
problem, namely that the linguists of that time worked with a ‘skewed 
database’, in which the data came from only a fraction of the world’s 
thousands of languages. The introduction to Saussure’s Course states 
that one aim of linguistics should be “to describe and trace the history 
of all observable languages” (Saussure 1959[1916]: 6), but the book 
itself mentions only a handful non-Eurasian languages, none of which 
merit any illustrative examples. 
The 20th century saw a wealth of new branches of linguistics, and 
most linguists have recognized the importance of a diverse database of 
languages. However, since much of this development has taken place 
within a Saussurean framework,7 the question of sound symbolism 
“[has been] reduced to the status of curious but irrelevant oddities in 
modern linguistics in general” (Hamano 1998: 211). 
 
 
2.3. Cross-modal sound symbolism 
 
In opposition to the dictum (sometimes approaching a dogma) of ‘the 
arbitrariness of the linguistic sign’, the notion of sound symbolism was 
used during most of the 20th century to highlight the existence of a 
                                                 
6  Schlegel 1857, quoted in http://ideophone.org/early-sources-on-african-
ideophones-schlegel/. 
7  For example, in a recent textbook, Yule (2006: 10) boldly states “It is generally 
the case that there is no ‘natural’ connection between a linguistic form and its 
meaning. […] There are some words in language with sounds that seem to ‘echo’ 
the sounds of objects or activities and hence seem to have a less arbitrary con-
nection. English examples are cuckoo, CRASH, slurp, squelch or whirr. However, 
these onomatopoeic words are relatively rare in human language.” 
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diverse array of linguistic phenomena in which “a sound unit such as a 
phoneme, syllable, feature, or tone [can] go beyond its linguistic 
function as a contrastive, non-meaning-bearing unit, to directly 
express some kind of meaning” (Nuckolls 1999: 228), or a “direct 
linkage between sound and meaning” (Hinton et al. 1994: 1). This has, 
however, been a minority position, and as Hamano (1998: 3) remarks 
“[discussion] of sound symbolism in natural languages often trigger 
laymen’s curiosity but linguists’ skepticism”. 
The main argument in favor of sound symbolism is that resemb-
lances between ‘sound patterns’ and meanings go beyond clear, but 
admittedly peripheral, cases of onomatopoeia such as the English 
words meow and bang. In this case there is indeed a degree of resemb-
lance between the words’ sound patterns and the sounds produced by 
certain animals or inanimate objects. This is uncontroversial since 
both expression and content involve the same sensory modality: 
audition. However, the number of non-arbitrary signs in the languages 
of the world would increase dramatically if similarities across moda-
lities can also be considered, or what is sometimes called ‘synesthetic 
sound symbolism’ (Hinton et al. 1994). Let us consider in order two 
different kinds of phenomena that bare evidence for this: first existing 
expressions in the lexica of a variety of languages, and then experi-
mental studies with fictive or unknown expressions, showing speakers’ 
ability to be able to actively find such cross-modal correspondences. 
 
2.3.1. Ideophones 
 
A huge number of expressions that are claimed to display a non-
arbitrary relation between expression and meaning are attested in 
languages on all continents, but are perhaps best known from West 
Africa and East Asia. Different terms are used in different scholarly 
traditions, but the most common ones are ideophones in Africanist 
literature (Childs 1994), expressives for Austroasiatic languages (Diff-
loth 1976; Svantesson 1983), and mimetics for Japanese and Korean 
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(Hamano 1998; Sohn 1999; Ivanova 2006). Such terminological 
profusion is confusing, since the phenomenon referred to appears to 
be the same, as illustrated below. To avoid confusion, we will con-
sistently use the term ‘ideophones’ in the remainder of this article. 
As examples of ideophones, consider the Japanese expressions 
koro-koro ‘small object rolling continously’ and goro-goro ‘large object 
rolling continuosly’ (Kita 2008). We may observe several typical 
features: (a) reduplication, complete or partial, is common though not 
necessary characteristic, (b) there are often, but again not always, 
contrasts in the sound-forms corresponding to differences in meaning, 
(c) to the extent that there is a resemblance between sound-patterns 
and meanings, this is at a rather ‘abstract’ level: it is not the sound of 
‘objects rolling’ that is being imitated, and the contrast between [k] 
and [ɡ] can hardly be said to correspond to an auditory feature related 
to size. 
In fact, a class of Japanese ideophones (mimetics) sometimes called 
‘psychomimes’ (Baba 2003) are even said to express mental states, and 
it is far from clear how this can be regarded as a relation of ‘resemb-
lance’ or ‘imitation’ between sound patterns and meanings (see 
Ikegami, Zlatev 2007). (1) shows one such example, borrowed from 
Kita (2008: 31). 
 
(1) Taro-wa   sutasuta-to  haya-aruki-o si-ta 
 Taro-TOP  IDPH-COMP haste-walk-ACC do-PAST 
 ‘Taro walked hurriedly’ 
 
To consider a different language, (2) and (3) used by Dingemanse, 
show ideophones in the Niger-Congo language Siwu spoken in Ghana. 
The examples are taken from spontaneous discourse.8 
                                                 
8  Dingemanse, Mark. ‘How to do things with ideophones: observations on the 
use of vivid sensory language in Siwu’. Paper presented at the SOAS Research 
Seminar, June 3 2009, London. 
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(2)  ɔ-̀ɔ-̀fiɛ  mùnyɛm̀ùnyɛ ̀
3SG-FUT-shine IDPH.sparklingly 
‘It will shine sparklingly’ 
 
(3) ɔ-̀to ɔ-̀tu kɔkɔ itì  tsɔk̀wɛt́sɔk̀wɛ ́
3SG-PROG 3SG-cut  fowl head IDPH.sawing 
‘He is cutting off the fowl’s head (in a sawing or cutting manner)’ 
 
Again, we notice features (a) and (c) listed above (Dingemanse does 
not mention any contrasts in these particular examples), and we could 
perhaps add two more: ideophones are rather hard to translate, and do 
not lend themselves easily to paraphrases with other expressions. 
Dingemanse, for example, describes Siwu ideophones as “typically 
evoking a sensory event as a whole rather than describing just one 
aspect of it”. For example, in (2) above, mùnyɛm̀ùnyɛ ̀is not simply an 
intensifying word such as ‘very’, and it can only be used with verbs 
such as fiɛ (‘sparkle’, ‘shine’). Finally, when speakers of Siwu are asked 
about their perceived function of such ideophones, they typically reply 
that “without them, speech is bland”, and that they “make stories more 
interesting”. Similar accounts of ideophones are also given by Japanese 
speakers.  
Several dictionaries of Niger-Congo and Bantu languages contain 
thousands of entries for ideophones (Childs 1994). Diffloth (1976) 
reports similar numbers from Austroasiatic languages. There are 
dictionaries of Japanese especially devoted to ideophones, and they are 
also found in many ordinary dictionaries (Ivanova 2006). One 
preliminary conclusion is that ideophones are indeed not “far fewer 
than is generally believed”, as Saussure claimed. Also the pure fact that 
there could be dictionaries of such items, shows, firstly, that despite 
what was suggested above, their meaning can be approximately 
rendered through other linguistic expressions, and they are not as 
“sterile, […] unfit to express anything beyond the one object which 
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they imitate” as Müller (1869: 361) claimed. Secondly and more 
importantly, their possible presence in a dictionary shows that they are 
truly conventional, that is, part of the common knowledge, shared by 
the speakers of the respective languages (see Itkonen 2003, 2008; 
Zlatev 2007). Since by all accounts they are not at the same time 
‘arbitrary’, ideophones clearly show the mistake of conflating conven-
tionality and arbitrariness. 
At the same time, their non-arbitrariness is rather difficult to pin-
point. As shown above, the statement that there is a ‘synesthetic’ 
relation between expression and content ‘across modalities’ is not 
altogether clear. Which modalities? Is this a relation of similarity 
(resemblance) and if so, along which dimensions can such cross-
modal similarity be established? Furthermore, since ideophones are as 
was pointed out conventional, it is not obvious that any potential 
similarity plays any cognitive role in their synchronic use. To address 
these issues we need to turn to psychological evidence. 
 
 
2.3.2. Evidence for ‘on-line’ mapping between  
sound patterns and meanings 
 
Since the 1920s, numerous experiments have been performed to show 
that when people are asked to match certain kinds of meanings with 
fictive or unknown word forms, the outcome is significantly higher 
than chance. Sapir (1929) investigated what he called ‘phonetic 
symbolism’ among 500 English speakers. He presented participants 
with fictive word pairs differing only in their vowel — for example, mil 
and mal — and two contrasting meanings to the words in each pair, 
for example, ‘small table’ and ‘big table’. The results showed that in 
80% of the cases the participants assigned the word containing [a] to 
the larger object, and [i] to the smaller one.  
The same year, Köhler (1929) introduced the fictive words takete 
and baluma (later changed to maluma), which he predicted would be 
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matched with a pointy, angular figure, and a smooth, wavy figure, 
respectively. His own experiments, and later those of others confirmed 
Köhler’s hypothesis with results showing that speakers of different 
languages do tend to match words and such figures far more often 
than chance predicts (Nuckolls 1999; Westbury 2005; Hunter-Smith 
2007). The phenomenon has been called “shape symbolism”. 
The actual word pairs used in these experiments have varied, but in 
general, one word contains voiceless stops [p, t, k] and closed un-
rounded vowels [i, e], and the other contains voiced stops [b, d, ɡ], 
sonorants [m, n, l, ŋ] and open rounded vowels [u, o, ɔ]. Firth (1957) 
mentions kikeriki and oombooloo, and Ramachandran and Hubbard 
(2001) introduced bouba and kiki, which have become the latest 
‘standard’. In their influential study, 95% of the participants matched 
bouba with the round, wavy figure, and kiki with the pointy, angular 
figure. The explanation of this phenomenon has, however, again been 
given in rather vague terms: “[…] the representation of certain lip and 
tongue movements in motor brain maps may be mapped in non-
arbitrary ways onto certain sound inflections and phonemic represen-
tations in auditory regions” (Ramachandran, Hubbard 2001: 10). This 
description is in line with Ramachandran’s theory of the phenomenon 
of synaesthesia, the involuntary linking of certain senses due to innate 
“cross-wiring”. But as Ikegami and Zlatev (2007) observe, such “shape 
symbolism” is qualitatively different from true synaesthesia in not 
being involuntary: seeing certain figures is not accompanied auto-
matically with certain sound perceptions, or vice versa. Furthermore, a 
condition for the success of such cross-modal mappings is that figures 
and sound patterns can be found to differ along the same qualitative 
dimension. In this particular case, this could be said to be the 
dimension ROUNDNESS (or conversely POINTEDNESS). In the 
studies performed by Sapir, it was SIZE. 
In a related type of experiment, participants have been given two 
contrasting words (small–big, round–flat, etc.) in a familiar language 
and two words in an unfamiliar language, and asked to attempt to 
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match these. Studies of this kind have been conducted since the 1930s, 
involving several unrelated languages (Hunter-Smith 2007: 23f). 
Brown et al. (1955) asked English speakers to match word pairs in 
English with Chinese, Czech and Hindi. For all three unfamiliar lan-
guages, over half of the word pairs were matched correctly signifi-
cantly better than chance, sometimes by over 90% of the participants.  
Two conditions for the success of such experiments could be 
observed. First, participants are to match a pair of familiar words, with 
a pair of unfamiliar ones. Second, the familiar words should contrast 
along a given dimension (as noted above for “shape symbolism”) and 
thus form antonym pairs, for example, small–big, round–flat, bright–
dark. For example, when Maltzman et al. (1956) performed a study in 
which English speakers were asked to match antonyms in Croatian 
and Japanese (both of which were unknown to the speakers), they 
failed to perform this at levels higher than chance. When they were 
also given the antonyms in English, they performed significantly better 
than chance. In another study, Brackbill and Little (1957) did not use 
antonyms, but rather a list of highly frequent words in Chinese, 
Japanese and Hebrew. English speakers were asked to match given 
word pairs across languages, but failed. 
In the next section, we offer an explanation of these findings, but 
let us first take stock. 
 
 
2.4. From sound symbolism to cross-modal iconicity 
 
As shown in this overview, the age-long debate on whether linguistic 
signs are fundamentally conventional or ‘natural’ has been troubled 
with conceptual unclarity and unnecessary polarization, both of which 
increased when conventionality was equated with arbitrariness at the 
end of the 19th century, most famously by Saussure. On the one hand, 
it is impossible to deny that linguistic signs are semiotic conventions, 
or even norms, since they are commonly known and there are public 
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criteria for their correct application, as shown by the possibility of 
describing them in dictionaries (Itkonen 2003, 2008). However, this 
does not exclude that their origin may be due, at least in part, to non-
arbitrary criteria such as partial similarity between expression and 
content, and that this similarity is maintained, at least for certain 
(classes of) expressions and more so for some languages than others.  
On the other side, proponents of sound symbolism, from Cratylus 
onwards, seem to have overstated their claims. Even if some form or 
degree of resemblance (between sound pattern and meaning) can be 
established for some expressions, and more so in some languages than 
others, such resemblance would not be sufficient for understanding 
what the sound patterns mean, if the pairings were not also conven-
tional. Even the most sound-symbolic linguistic expressions are not 
like realistic drawings (pictures), were the resemblance relation is 
indeed sufficient, as we will explicate in the next section. 
What seems to have been lacking is a consistent conceptual frame-
work in which to analyze the non-arbitrariness of (some) linguistic 
signs. To this testifies the loose definitions of the phenomenon: it is 
not sufficiently explained in which ways sound patterns are supposed 
to ‘imitate’, ‘directly express’ or ‘resemble’ meanings, especially if this 
is to take place across sensory modalities.  
In the next section, we propose to provide the outlines of such a 
conceptual framework, borrowing seminal concepts from the other 
“founding father” of semiotics, C. S. Peirce, (the first being Saussure) 
interpreted and further developed by G. Sonesson (1989, 2007, 2009b). 
In such a perspective, the term ‘sound symbolism’ becomes less 
adequate, since for Peirce a ‘symbol’ is a sign that expressly lacks any 
motivated relation (‘ground’) between expression (‘representamen’) 
and content (‘object’). Since the professed relation between expression 
and content observed in ideophones and cross-modal mappings 
(reviewed in Section 2.3) is that of similarity (resemblance), a more 
appropriate term for the phenomenon appears to be cross-modal 
iconicity.   
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3. A semiotic analysis of cross-modal iconicity 
 
3.1. Signs and their ground 
 
Semiotics is usually characterized as “the study of signs”,9 but this is 
hardly adequate since semiotics studies meanings of all kinds — from 
those inherent in direct perception and sensorimotor experience, to 
cultural phenomena such as music and dance, to visually perceived 
representations like pictures and gestures, to language, and its variety 
of meanings, on the levels of prosody, lexis, grammar and discourse. If 
all of these are characterized as ‘signs’, the concept becomes extensi-
vely broad (see Sonesson 1989, 2007). Hence, we find it better to 
regard semiotics as “the systematic study of meaning” (Fuller 1997: 30; 
compare Sonesson 2009a; Zlatev 2009). Within this study, the concept 
of sign nevertheless retains a crucial place, and the question of how the 
capacity to use signs emerged in evolution, and develops in ontogeny 
is of vital importance (Donald 1991, 2001; Mandler 1996; Deacon 
1997; Tomasello 1999, 2008; DeLoache 2004; Sonesson 2007, 2009a; 
Zlatev 2007, 2008, 2009).   
Peirce defined his central concept many times, but the following is 
perhaps the most famous one: 
 
[a] sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in 
the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. 
The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all 
respects, but in reference to a sort of idea which I have sometimes called the 
ground of the representamen. (CP 2.229) 
 
The sign (as a whole) can be said to involve at least three entities 
interacting in the process of semiosis (see Fig. 1): a representamen 
which stands for an object, “to somebody” (the interpreter). The 
                                                 
9  For example, Chandler, Semiotics for Beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/ 
Documents/S4B/ 
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representamen gives rise to an effect in “the mind of that person”, 
namely an interpretant (De Cuypere 2008: 30ff; Parker 1998: 144ff). It 
is crucial that the representamen and the object are related only “in 
some respect or capacity” and “not in all respects”; otherwise they 
would be identical and inseparable. This basis of relating the represen-
tamen to the object is a fourth entity in semiosis, the ground. 
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic illustration of semiosis (N.B. in order to simplify the 
following figures, the interpretant will not be drawn). 
 
 
Based on the nature of the ground — that is, in what way a repre-
sentamen stands for an object — Peirce divided signs into three so-
called “ideal types”, the first of which is of central importance for our 
analysis. In an iconic sign, the ground is that of similarity, or more 
precisely when the representamen and object are found to share 
certain similar qualities independently of each other. The typical 
example is a picture and its visual similarity to that which it depicts. 
The second type is an indexical sign, where the ground is not based on 
similarity, but on contiguity in time and space. The third type is the 
symbolic sign. This differs from the earlier two by being based only on 
convention, for example, using $ as a sign for ‘US dollar’. It is im-
portant to bear in mind that this taxonomy presents ideal types, and 
that real-world signs usually contain properties from more than one of 
the three, that is, more than one type of ground. 
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3.1.1. Primary and secondary iconicity 
 
Since actual signs involve combinations of grounds, Sonesson (1997) 
introduced an important distinction between iconic signs. In primary 
iconic signs, the iconic ground is sufficient for establishing the sign, 
and any possible conventional ground plays a secondary role. The 
obvious example of this is again a drawing: while stylistic conventions 
of drawing differ enormously, knowledge of them is not required in 
order to recognize that a particular drawing depicts, say, a human face. 
On the other hand, if the sign is established by other means — by 
convention, by pointing to a referent while uttering its name (its 
representamen) or by simply telling the interpreter what “something 
means” — and any possible iconic ground is found by the interpreter 
only later (if at all), this would be a case of a secondary iconic sign.  
 
Primary iconicity: the perception of an iconic ground obtaining between 
two things is one of the reasons for positing the existence of a sign 
function joining two things together as expression and content. Secondary 
iconicity: the knowledge about the existence of a sign function between two 
things is one of the reasons for the perception of an iconic ground between 
these same things. (Sonesson 1997: 741, our emphases) 
 
Sonesson illustrates primary iconicity with pictures, and secondary 
iconicity with so-called droodles: simple drawings whose ground be-
comes evident only once it is pointed out (Fig. 2). But the distinction is 
perhaps even more relevant in discussing iconicity in language. 
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Figure 2. A primary iconic sign: a picture of an elephant, and a secondary iconic 
sign (a ‘droodle’) showing (for example) a person playing trombone in a wardrobe, 
or perhaps a paper clip placed under an envelope. 
 
 
3.1.2. Iconicity in language 
 
Jakobson (1971[1965]) first introduced the Peircean concept of 
iconicity into linguistics, and over the last 30 years, it has become a 
popular term in the cognitive-functional school of linguistics, whose 
representatives have applied it in analyses of syntax and morphology 
(Haiman 1980; Croft 2003; Itkonen 2004, 2005). At the same time, 
there has been persistent disagreement on how to apply the notion. 
For example, Croft (2003) claims that the principle “one expression — 
one meaning”, that is, the tendency to limit polysemy (one expres-
sion — many meanings) and synonymy (several expression — one 
meaning) is a case of linguistic iconicity. Itkonen (2004) justifiably 
objects that this is an overextension of the concept, since expressions 
and meanings do not exist independently of one another (which, as 
pointed out above, is a requirement for iconicity), but constitute the 
two sides of the linguistic sign; else we would be back to the 
nomenclature view of language criticized by Saussure.  
Already Jakobson suggested that plural endings illustrate an iconi-
city of quantity: longer expressions correspond to a larger quantity. 
On the other hand, Haspelmath (2008) objects that the phenomenon 
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is better explained through frequency of use: more commonly oc-
curring types of word (the ones in singular) have shorter forms since 
this is simply more economical. There are problems to this analysis, 
but if we accept it, we could use Sonesson’s distinction between 
primary and secondary iconic signs to explicate it: to the extent that 
singular/plural forms of nouns can be viewed as iconic to lower/higher 
quantity, such an iconic sign is only of the secondary type; it is 
established by convention, and the ‘similarity’ between expression and 
meaning (found by linguists) is epiphenomenal: it plays no role either 
in synchronic interpretation or in diachronic origin of the plural 
morphemes. Sonesson himself has made suggestions along these lines: 
“As for iconicity in language and in music, it most of the time seems to 
be secondary” (Sonesson 2009b: 51). De Cuypere (2008) argues for a 
similar position.  
However, if this were altogether true, it would effectively devalue 
iconicity as an explanatory concept in linguistics. It would, for 
example, make the iconicity of ideophones analogous to that of 
droodles: possibly vicarious similarities that can be perceived only 
after the signs have been established by convention. However, there is 
something deeply unsatisfactory to this latter claim. On the one hand, 
the sheer number of ideophones in at least some languages seems to 
speak against it. Even more, it would make the ‘on-line’ cross-modal 
mappings that have been experimentally attested inexplicable. There-
fore, Ikegami and Zlatev proposed that there is indeed more than 
secondary iconicity in language:  
 
We would like to suggest that the distinction between primary and secondary 
iconicity is more of a cline, defined by the degree to which the “sign function” 
(i.e. knowing what an expression represents) is necessary for perceiving the 
similarity involved in iconicity. From this perspective, the bouba/kiki pheno-
menon is somewhat intermediary in the cline. (Ikegami, Zlatev 2007: 270) 
 
As it stands, however, this formulation is also unsatisfactory: it is not 
really clear how phenomena such as “shape symbolism” can be 
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regarded as lying “between” primary and secondary iconicity, since the 
two are defined in a complementary way. In the following, we provide 
a possible resolution to this dilemma.  
 
 
3.2. Cross-modal iconicity as a combination  
of primary and secondary iconicity 
 
Let us again consider the two types of experiments described in 
Section 2.3.2, those involving the matching between fictive words and 
figures, and those involving the matching between words in a familiar 
language and an unfamiliar one — and attempt to provide a semiotic 
explication of their findings in terms of the notions discussed in the 
previous sub-section. 
 
 
3.2.1. Matching fictive words and figures 
 
In the experiments carried out in the tradition inaugurated by Köhler 
and made famous by Ramachandran and colleagues more recently, 
there are always two representamina (the fictive words such as bouba 
and kiki) and two perceptual objects exhibiting some kind of contrast 
(round vs. pointy figures, small vs. big objects, etc.). The interpreter 
will succeed in performing the matching to the extent that he or she 
can discern a similarity, that is, an iconic ground, between the 
representamina and objects in order to create two signs. Schematically, 
this can be presented as a sequence of three steps (see Fig. 3). Step 1 
shows the initial conditions in the experiment with two separate sets 
of representamina (R1, R2) and two objects (O1, O2). Step 2 shows 
that two parallel grounds are discerned (dashed lines), constituting a 
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composite analogous ground: R1 is to O1 as R2 is to O2.10 On this 
basis in Step 3, the linking of representamina and objects is established, 
creating two (presumed) signs. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Matching fictive words to figures by finding a composite analogous 
ground. 
 
 
Is this to be regarded a matter of primary or secondary iconcity? We 
propose that it is not one or the other, and not something “in 
between” (as suggested by Ikegami and Zlatev (2007)), but rather a 
combination of the two, as follows: 
First, the interpreter is told that a combination of sign relations 
exists between the pairs of representamina R1 and R2 and perceptual 
objects O1 and O2. This is a precondition for discerning the com-
posite analogous ground in Step 2. That is, knowledge of the existence 
of sign relationships, “is one of the reasons for the perception of an 
iconic ground”, that is, conforming to the definition of secondary 
iconicity, given earlier. 
Once this analogous ground is perceived, however, it serves as the 
basis for positing specific sign relations between R1–O1 and R2–O2 in 
Step 3. That is, quoting again Sonesson’s definition of primary 
                                                 
10  One R-O ground would be, strictly speaking, sufficient for performing the 
analogy if there are only two (presumptive) signs involved, as an anonymous 
reviewer points out.  
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iconicity (see above): “the perception of an iconic ground obtaining 
between two things is one of the reasons for positing the existence of a 
sign function joining two things together as expression and content”. 
Observe that the precondition for the success of the second step is 
that the contrastive relationship between the two expressions 
(representamina) on the one side is found to correspond to an 
analogous contrastive relationship between the two objects. This kind 
of second-order iconicity is characteristic of analogy (Itkonen 2005), 
that is, similarity of relations rather than objects. It also presupposes 
the characteristic feature of sign-to-sign contrast emphasized by 
structuralism, though not the tenet of “the arbitrariness of linguistic 
sign”. Therefore, we may conclude that the primary iconicity involved 
in the process is doubly conditioned by, on the one hand, prior 
knowledge that there are (yet unspecified) sign relations (secondary 
iconicity), and the principle of linguistic contrast, on the other hand. 
We will return to this in what follows. 
  
 
3.2.2. Matching familiar antonyms with ones  
in an unfamiliar language 
 
In the case of matching two antonymic words R1 and R2 in a familiar 
language (for example, large and small) to corresponding words R3 
and R4 in an unfamiliar language, we have no perceptual objects, but 
since the first two words are familiar, the interpreter will have recourse 
to their meanings via the sign relationship and can imagine, for 
example, a LARGE and SMALL object. This is shown as Step 1 in 
Figure 4.  In Step 2, due to secondary iconicity, an analogous ground is 
discerned between representamina and objects. In Step 3, a similar 
analogous ground is found, R3–O1 and R4–O2, and on this basis a 
sign relationship is posited to exist between these (that is, primary 
iconicity) in Step 4. Thereby R1 is matched to R3, and R2 to R4.   
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Figure 4. Matching familiar antonyms with those in an unknown language, by 
finding a higher-order analogy between two composite  analogous grounds. 
 
 
The rate of success in this type of experiments was typically lower than 
those in which fictive words were matched to figures,11 which can be 
explained by the following two factors. First, the matching is per-
formed across sets of composite grounds, that is, a third-order relation. 
Given this complexity, it is nevertheless remarkable that such experi-
ments meet success at all! Second, all word-forms (representamina) 
are actual existing words which may or may not (for example, due to 
                                                 
11  Some antonyms give very high degrees of correct matching, while others 
show results identical to chance. In some cases, different languages appear to have 
‘reversed’ grounds, leading to results significantly worse than chance (Hunter-
Smith 2007). 
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historical sound change) have a degree of iconic ground characteristic 
of fictive forms, explicitly chosen like bouba and kiki or mil and mal to 
exhibit (cross-modal) similarity with corresponding figures. On the 
other hand, this testifies that iconic grounds are in many cases 
preserved in languages, and many signs are indeed not arbitrary. This 
also suggests that cross-modal iconicity in language, far from being 
epiphenomenal, can under appropriate conditions have cognitive con-
sequences, for example, in foreign language learning. 
Again, however, one of the “appropriate conditions” is prior know-
ledge that what we have in the two languages are synonymous lin-
guistic signs: remember that experiments were unsuccessful when two 
sets of representamina in unfamiliar languages were to be matched. 
Therefore secondary iconicity (in Step 1) was a precondition for the 
operation of primary iconicity (in Step 4). Also as pointed out in 2.3.2, 
participants were able to solve the task only when O1 and O2 were 
contrasted on the same quality dimension (SIZE, ROUNDNESS etc), 
but not when expressions were picked on factors such as frequency. 
Finally, the principle of inter-sign contrast was assumed here as well, 
as part of the design of the experiment, and the instructions given to 
participants. 
 
3.3. Summary and further questions 
 
In this section, we showed how moving beyond the vague formu-
lations of “sound symbolism” and adopting a semiotic framework 
distinguishing between primary and secondary iconicity allowed us to 
make sense of experimental results, and to confirm the cognitive and 
linguistic reality of a degree of primary iconicity (in combination with 
secondary iconicity and inter-sign contrast along uniform dimen-
sions). Furthermore, discerning the (composite) iconic grounds neces-
sary for performing tasks such as those that were here explicated 
presupposes the ability to find similarities across the modalities of 
hearing (and speaking) and at least the modality of vision. 
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Many questions, however, remain. How is such cross-modal map-
ping achieved? Do speakers perceive the form of their vocal apparatus, 
haptically and propioceptively, for example as “round” in forming the 
sound [o] when mapping to a roundish figure, or is the matching 
performed on a deeper, more abstract or even ‘amodal’ level? Is the 
matching performed on the basis of segments (such as phonemes), or 
even distinctive features, such as voiced/unvoiced, or is it rather a 
matter of transitions between segments and whole sound patterns? If it 
is a matter of segments, do vowels or consonants play a more deter-
mining role for establishing what was here called the iconic ground? 
The conceptual explication offered here cannot help us to answer 
these questions, and we need to turn to so-called empirical methods. 
Since we are not aware of studies which have been designed explicitly 
to address questions such as those given above, we performed a case 
study of our own, which we describe in the following section. 
 
 
4. A case study of cross-modal iconicity 
 
4.1. Goals and method 
 
We performed an experiment in the tradition of Köhler (1929) and 
Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001), described in Section 2.3.2, asking 
Swedish participants to match fictive words and visual figures. In 
contrast to earlier studies, we decided to utilize a larger range of word 
pairs, and a more systematic comparison of different types of sounds: 
vowels, consonants and combinations of these. The purpose of this 
was to attempt to discern the relative importance of vowels and con-
sonants, as well as the patterns of these taken as a whole, for perceiving 
an iconic (cross-modal) ground that would allow the participants to 
‘correctly’ match the fictive words and figures, as analyzed in Section 3. 
First, we selected maximal phonetic contrasts between consonants 
and between vowels, based on the ‘synaesthetic’ properties that have 
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been ascribed to such sounds in previous studies, and on the basis of 
our own intuitions.  
 
Consonants:  
voiceless obstruents (‘hard’, ‘sharp’, ‘pointy’)
 vs.  
voiced sonorants (‘soft’, ‘smooth’, ‘heavy’):  
[p, t, k, tʃ] vs. [m, l, n, ŋ] 
  
Vowels:  
front close unrounded (‘sharp’, ‘small’)
 vs.  
back open  (‘round’, ‘large’):  
[i] vs. [u] 
 
Second, we defined four pair-types of fictive words forming simple 
reduplicative patterns of the form CVCV, using these phonetic 
contrasts in different ways. These constituted four different conditions. 
Conditions (a) and (b) contrasted individual sounds only, while (c) 
and (d) contrasted combinations of these, as follows: 
 
a) Two words with different vowels, but the same sonorant 
consonant, for example, lili vs. lulu. 
b) Two words with different consonants, but with the same vowel 
[i], for example, kiki vs. nini. 
c) Incongruent combination: a word with a ‘hard’ consonant and 
‘round’ vowel was contrasted with a word with a ‘soft’ consonant 
and ‘sharp’ vowel, for example, tutu vs. lili. 
d) Congruent combination: a word with a ‘hard’ consonant and a 
‘sharp’ vowel was contrasted with a word with ‘soft’ consonant 
and ‘round’ vowel, for example, titi vs. lulu. 
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The actual pair-types used in the experiment are given in Table 1 in 
Section 4.3. The task for the participants was to match the ‘words’ in 
each pair of figures such as those shown in Figure 5, which were 
similar to those used by Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001), that is, a 
sharp pointy ‘star’-like figure, and a roundish ‘amoeba’-like figure. 
 
 
Figure 5. The contrastive figures used in the experiment: the ‘star’ and the 
‘amoeba’. All figures were of these types, but with slight variation, so that no parti-
cipant was shown two identical figures. 
 
 
4.2. Hypotheses 
 
We formulated a set of three conditional hypotheses, on the basis of 
the contrasts between the four types of word pairs (conditions). 
H1. If the iconic ground between sound patterns and figures is 
above all discerned on the basis of contrast between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
consonants, then conditions (b), (c) and (d) should give rise to a high 
rate of matching of the words with these consonants to the ‘amoeba’ 
and ‘star’ figures, respectively, while condition (a) should lead to a 
lower rate, or to no effect higher than chance. 
H2. If the iconic ground is above all due to contrasts between 
‘round’ and ‘sharp’ vowels, then a higher rate of ‘correct’ matching 
should be found in conditions (a), (c) and (d), and a lower rate or no 
effect at all in condition (b). 
H3. If the iconic ground is due to the combination of consonants 
and vowels, (and possibly the transitions between them), then the 
congruent condition (d) should lead to the highest rate of ‘correct’ 
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matching, followed by the cases in which there was contrast in only 
vowels (a) and consonants (b), and least of all in the incongruent 
condition (c). 
Our expectation was that H3 would find the strongest support. 
 
 
4.3. Participants and procedure 
 
In the experiment, 20 participants (9 female, median age: 25) were 
recruited among students at Lund University, and compensated with a 
small sum, corresponding to a lunch ticket. The task was administered 
through the software E-prime. The 20 participants were divided into 
four groups of 5 (numbered 1 to 4 in Table 1). Each participant in the 
4 groups was given a specific version of the software, which presented 
the participant with one instance of each of the 4 word pairs 
conforming to the conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d), without hearing the 
same fictive word twice, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The spoken stimuli used in the experiment, ordered by word pair type (A 
to D) and participant group (1 to 4). 
 
 A. Vowel B. Consonant C. Incongruent D. Congruent 
 C2V1 vs. C2V2 C1V1 vs. C2V1 C1V2 vs. C2V1 C1V1 vs. C2V2 
1 lili lulu tʃitʃi mimi pupu ŋiŋi kiki nunu 
2 mimi mumu pipi ŋiŋi kuku nini titi lulu 
3 ŋiŋi ŋuŋu kiki nini tutu lili tʃitʃi mumu 
4 nini nunu titi lili tʃutʃu mimi pipi ŋuŋu 
 
 
When the target figures (see Figure 5 above) were presented on the 
screen, randomized for left-right order, a pre-recorded voice was 
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heard saying (in Swedish) a sentence conforming to the schema: “Let’s 
say that one of these figures is called <Word X> and the other <Word 
Y>, which one would you call <Word X/Word Y>?” The fictive words 
for the variables <Word X> and <Word Y> were taken automatically 
from a list consisting of the word pairs given in Table 1, in a carefully 
arranged way. The order in which the elements of the word pair were 
played was randomized, so that the ‘harder’ sound pattern would 
sometime come first, and sometime second. Correspondingly, the 
question of which sound pattern was to be explicitly matched with 
which figure (and which left to be matched to the other by logical 
inference), half of the time concerned <Word X>, and half of the time 
<Word Y>. Participants had the possibility to repeat the spoken 
stimuli as many times as they wanted, by pressing a certain key. In our 
debriefing questions, however, none of the participants reported that 
they had done this. 
The order in which the conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d) were pre-
sented was also randomized, and the figures were slightly varied in 
each of the four conditions, but always having a ‘star’-like figure and 
an ‘amoeba’-like figure. Their relative left-right position was also 
randomized, to fully eliminate any possible bias that could arise, for 
example, from the left-to-right direction of writing in Swedish. The 
response was to be given by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard. 
Interspersed between these key tasks were 4 ‘filler tasks’. One 
consisted of the participant hearing a short sound clip in a foreign 
language, and then choosing from three alternatives which language it 
was. The other tasks were ‘logical’ questions, similar to those used in 
IQ tests. 
The purpose of avoiding presenting a given sound pattern (fictive 
word) twice was that once the participant had matched a particular 
sound to a figure, this was likely to affect the decision on a subsequent 
trial, in which the fictive word would have participated in a different 
contrast. For example, if a participant’s first word pair were lili vs. lulu, 
and lili was matched with the ‘star’-like figure, and then the second 
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pair were lili vs. kiki, it is likely that the participant would have been 
disinclined to give the name lili to the ‘amoeba’ figure, despite the fact 
that kiki may sound ‘sharper’ to them in this context. 
Each participant performed the experiment in a closed room, 
sitting alone at the computer. On completion, participants were asked 
a few ‘debriefing questions’ in a short interview carried out by the first 
author, in order to attempt to understand something about their 
reasoning when performing the matching task. These interviews were 
recorded, and key portions were subsequently transcribed. 
 
 
4.4. Results 
 
In order to evaluate the three hypotheses, the quantitative data was 
analyzed by pooling the replies from all 20 participants for each of the 
four conditions. The results are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Results from the word-to-figure matching tasks, divided by conditions. 
 
Condition ‘star’ figure ‘amoeba’ figure 
A.  Vowel contrast [i] – 90%   
[u] – 10% 
[i] – 10%   
[u] – 90% 
B.  Consonant 
contrast 
[p, t, k, tʃ] – 80% 
[m, l, n, ŋ] – 20% 
[p, t, k, tʃ] – 20% 
[m, l, n, ŋ] – 80% 
C.  Incongruent 
combination of 
V and C 
[u]+[p, t, k, tʃ] – 65% 
[i]+[m, l, n, ŋ] – 35% 
[u]+[p, t, k, tʃ] – 35% 
[i]+[m, l, n, ŋ] – 65% 
D. Congruent 
combination of 
V and C 
[i]+[p, t, k, tʃ] – 90% 
[u]+[m, l, n, ŋ] – 10% 
[i]+[p, t, k, tʃ] – 10% 
[u]+[m, l, n, ŋ] – 90% 
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Statistical analysis (binominal distribution) of the results showed that 
the results for conditions (a), (b) and (d) corresponded highly 
significantly to the expected (‘correct’) matching (obstruents and [i] 
matched to the ‘star’ figure, sonorants and [u] to the ‘amoeba’ figure) 
(p < 0.01). In the case of (c) there seemed to be a certain bias for 
matching obstruents to ‘star’ and sonorants to ‘amoeba’, despite the 
fact that the vowel contrast should have ‘pulled’ in the opposite 
direction, as seen by the results in condition (a), but the bias for (c) 
was markedly lower (p = 0.13), and not significantly higher than 
chance.  
Concerning H1, stating that the iconic ground would be perceived 
above all on the basis of the consonant contrast, the results from 
condition (b) and (d) were supportive, but those in (a) and (c) 
contradictive. Hypothesis H2 was most clearly contradicted by the 
results in both conditions (b) and (c), despite the fact that (a) showed 
that even a contrast in the vowels alone was sufficient for a very high 
rate of expected matching (90%). The strongest evidence that it was 
not either vowels or consonants that serves as the ground for matching 
to the figures was (c) — the only condition in which the rate of 
expected matching fell below significance level. 
The results did not correspond entirely to H3, since the rate of 
expected matching in condition (d) was identical to that in (a) and 
nearly so in (b). But the finding that vowels and consonants play a role 
on their own, and that they significantly lowered the matching rate in 
our ‘incongruent combination’ (c), allows us to conclude that H3 was 
the hypothesis most clearly supported among the three. Therefore, we 
may conclude that the results showed that both vowels and consonants 
independently, and in combination, contribute to establishing the 
iconic ground in cross-modal iconicity of the type investigated in the 
study. 
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4.5. Discussion 
 
While our relatively low number of participants seemed to give rise to 
a ceiling effect of sorts — leveling out the possible differences between 
conditions (a), (b) and (d) — it is not implausible to conclude that the 
iconic ground was due to the whole sound pattern gestalt, rather than 
to individual segments. Consider one example of word pairs from the 
congruent condition (d). The sound patterns [kiki] and [mumu] 
contain sounds whose articulations differ greatly: [k] requires non-
vibrating vocal chords, and a blocking of the vocal tract, followed by a 
release of air. The vowel [i], on the other hand, requires a steady flow 
of air from the lungs, passing through vibrating vocal chords. These 
differences result in an abrupt transition between sounds in the sound 
pattern [kiki]. This can be seen in the first spectrogram in Figure 6. 
Inversely, the sounds [m] and [u] are very similar to each other, 
leading to a less abrupt transition. Both [m] and [u] are pronounced 
with vibrating vocal chords, and [m] involves a closing of the lips, 
interfering minimally with the tongue’s position for [u]. In [mumu], 
the lips are rounded and repeatedly pressed against each other, adding 
to a haptic-proprioceptive ‘softness’ of the sound pattern. 
A broad qualitative analysis of the debriefing interviews showed 
that participants had some awareness of the cross-modal similarities 
between figures and sound patterns, but (unsurprisingly) did not 
formulate this with sufficient meta-linguistic knowledge to allow us to 
judge whether they focused on segments (vowels and consonants) or 
on the whole patterns. The majority of the replies were such as those 
given in (4)–(7) (translated from Swedish), in which the participants 
mention “sounds” more generally, while only (8) mentions “conso-
nants” and (9) is rather indeterminate. 
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Figure 6. Spectrograms of the fictive words [kiki] and [mumu], as used in the 
experiment. The white part in the middle of [kiki] is silence (that is, a blocking of 
the vocal tract before a release of air). These spectrograms show 0–5,000 Hz and 
are 400 ms in duration. 
 
 
(4) “I associated certain sounds with certain shapes.” 
(5) “One of the words sounded like something soft, and the other 
as something hard.” 
(6) “The figures looked like the sounds in their names.” 
(7) “I felt how the words felt and sounded.” 
(8) “Hard consonants are sudden sounds.” 
(9) “Hard sounds are shorter. Drawn out sounds are softer.” 
 
Interestingly, few of the participants spontaneously mentioned 
“vowels”, despite the fact that in Swedish schools, for reasons of 
spelling rules, the vowels [i], [e], [y], [ɛ], and [ø] are usually called ‘soft 
vowels’ (mjuka vokaler), whereas [a], [u], [ʉ], and [o] are called ‘hard 
vowels’ (hårda vokaler). We were concerned that this fact could affect 
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the participants’ performance, and in the debriefing we explicitly 
asked them whether they had thought about these terms during the 
experiment, but none claimed to have done so. 
When asked to exemplify what they meant by ‘sharp’ and ‘soft’ 
sounds, participants replied with both consonants and vowels, in an 
expected manner. Voiceless obstruents were given as examples of 
‘hard’ and ‘pointy’ sounds, whereas the voiced sonorants were 
described with adjectives such as ‘soft’ and ‘round’. Although the 
vowels [i] and [u] were the only ones used in the experiment, parti-
cipants sometimes offered other vowels to express the difference 
between ‘sharp’ and ‘soft’ sounds. These were vowels that usually 
followed a back/front division, so that for example, [o] and [ɔ] were 
considered ‘soft’, ‘round’ vowels, and [e] and [y] were considered 
‘pointy’, ‘hard’ vowels. 
Concerning the still more difficult question how the participants 
managed to establish the similarity between figures and sound patters, 
the descriptions of the participants were not detailed enough to be able 
to judge, though the reply given in (7) suggests that haptic (or pro-
prioceptive) perception of the vocal tract during actual pronunciation 
was important. Indeed, some of the participants reported to have 
pronounced the words to themselves before making their choices. For 
the time being, we cannot offer more to the ‘how’ question than the 
somewhat speculative account offered by Ikegami and Zlatev, 
describing the study performed by Ramachandran and Hubbard 
(2001) using the expressions bouba and kiki: 
 
If we start with the shapes, the cross-modal mapping between vision and touch 
would allow them to be perceived as “soft” and “sharp” [respectively], 
motivating the use of these quasi-synaesthetic metaphors as a natural way to 
describe these figures. From the side of the expressions the production of the 
velar stop /k/, even more so combined with the front, unrounded vowel /i/ 
involves obstructions and narrowings in the vocal tract, which can similarly be 
perceived as “sharp” and “edgy”. On the other hand, the shape of the vocal tract 
and the lips in the production of /u/ in bouba are quite literally “roundish” and 
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the passage of air is “soft”. The mappings between the senses Vision-Touch-
Proprioception-Sound in internal meaning space thus provides for a correspon-
dence between the shapes and the labels that would be impossible otherwise. A 
robot, or a Martian with a very different kind of body […] would not be able to 
perceive the iconicity involved. (Ikegami, Zlatev 2007: 225) 
 
 
5. Overall summary and further research 
 
We began this article by asking whether the cognitive semiotic 
approach — combining methods and theoretical concepts from the 
humanities and cognitive sciences — could help provide “a dialectical 
synthesis that could help resolve the debate between ‘arbitrariness’ and 
‘sound symbolism’. The three ‘steps’ that we took to address this 
question are rather typical for this approach. First, to take a historical 
perspective, looking at how the problem has been framed over the 
centuries, as well as more recently, and what kinds of arguments and 
evidence have been considered relevant. Second, to attempt to re-
frame the problem, in (preferably) clearer concepts, and thirdly, to 
make this reframing amenable to empirical investigations, in order to 
enter a cycle of cross-fertilization with more pronouncedly philo-
sophical perspectives, such as those of semiotics and phenomenology 
(see Gallagher, Zahavi 2008; Sonesson 2007, 2009c; Zlatev 2009). 
In the process, we found reasons to propose not a Grand Dia-
lectical Synthesis, but several more minor ones, on all of these three 
levels. Let us here summarize our findings, relating, where appropriate, 
to questions deserving future research. 
 
 
5.1. The historical perspective 
 
As pointed out when summarizing Section 3, both extreme sides in the 
age-long (and continuing) debate have been in error: those claiming 
that language is essentially arbitrary (at least on the level of simple 
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signs), and those claiming something similar to what the early Witt-
genstein famously stated: that language “is a picture of reality”. The 
error of the first group, who we may (non-arbitrarily) call arbitrarians 
was due in part to the conflation of the concepts of convention and 
arbitrariness, and in part due to a ‘skewed database’ of linguistic 
evidence, disregarding non-European languages, and of course, the 
signed languages of the deaf, which were only recognised (in some 
quarters still grudgingly) as ‘true languages’ some 40 years ago. The 
error of the second group, the sound symbolists, was again due in part 
to lack of adequate concepts: just remember the profusion of terms 
used to describe the phenomenon: ‘sound symbolism’, ‘shape 
symbolism’, ‘phonetic symbolism’, ‘mimetics’, ‘expressives’, ‘ideopho-
nes’, ‘psychomimes’, ‘synaesthemes’ etc. in which sounds  ‘imitate’, 
‘directly express’, or ‘resemble’ meanings.  Many sound symbolists also 
show clear traces of a binary logic (that can still be observed in some 
cognitive-functional quarters nowadays), contrary to that of the 
arbitrarians: since language is not arbitrary, it must be essentially 
motivated, with resemblance, or iconicity as a chief factor. 
There have of course been many exceptions to such binary 
opposition between the two extremes (for example Givón 2002), some 
of these quite old, as can be seen in the following quote from Jespersen 
(1964[1922]: 397): 
 
Yes, of course it would be absurd to maintain that all words at all times in all 
languages had a signification corresponding exactly to their sounds, each sound 
having a definite meaning once for all. But is there really much more logic in the 
opposite extreme, which denies any kind of sound symbolism and sees in our 
words only a collection of wholly accidental and irrational associations of sound 
and meaning? 
  
But such voices have somehow been dwarfed over the ages, it seems. 
With the widening of the linguistic database during the 20th century, 
Saussure’s statement that sound-symbolic words “are never organic 
elements of a linguistic system”, became increasingly hard to maintain. 
Hinton et al. (1994) contains several descriptions of sound symbolic 
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systems in languages from all over the world, including less ‘exotic’ 
languages including English (Rhodes 1994; Oswalt 1994). But we sense 
a new possible error: when sound symbolism can no longer be denied, 
there are tendencies to present it as an ordinary linguistic ‘parameter’, 
like word-order, or an ‘areal feature’, like the presence of noun classi-
fiers or click consonants. For example, Svantesson (1983) classifies 
sound symbolic words in the Austroasiatic language Kammu as a 
distinct ‘word class’, with its own morphological, syntactic and into-
national features. But why should symbolic words constitute a unique 
word class in languages like Kammu and Japanese, but not in English 
or Spanish? To regard it simply as a typological/areal feature is hardly 
explanatory.  
To some extent, there is indeed evidence that (clearly) sound 
symbolic expressions are treated differently from those that are not, by 
their speakers and by processes of language change. Dingemanse 
(2009: 840f), for example, describes Siwu ideophones as displaying 
“deviant phonotactic patterns”. Hamano (1998: 86) points out that 
Japanese sound symbolic words have retained the word-initial sound 
[p], which, through sound change, has otherwise become [h] in 
Japanese. This can be seen as the result of a perceived connection 
between the sound [p] and its sound symbolic connotations of ‘an 
abrupt and explosive movement’. Even Jespersen (1964[1922]: 406) 
mentioned that English cuckoo [kʊku] has not undergone the regular 
sounds changes that would have resulted in [kʌku].  
Kita (1997, 2001) has attempted to provide a theoretical account of 
such a ‘dual code’ system. On the basis of considerable empirical basis, 
he argues that the meaning of Japanese ideophones (mimetics) 
consists of an ‘affect-imagistic dimension’, where “language has direct 
contact with sensory motor and affective information” (Kita 1997: 
320), while non-mimetic expressions such as quantifiers, logical 
operators, and the members of ordinary noun classes have their 
meanings in an ‘analytic dimension’ (compare Ikegami, Zlatev 2007). 
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There is a degree of appeal to such accounts, but again without 
additional explanations, it is mysterious why certain languages would 
rely heavily on the ‘affect-imagistic’ dimension compared to others. 
Furthermore, a strict separation between sound-symbolic and non-
sound symbolic expressions would seem to be contradicted by results 
such as those reviewed in Section 2.3.2, where the meaning of ‘ordi-
nary’ antonyms in unknown languages was in many cases ‘guessed’ 
correctly (when presented with corresponding familiar antonyms, and 
asked to match the two pairs).  
What is much more plausible, we propose, is an evolutionary expla-
nation. Iconicity is a key factor in the emergence of new expressions — 
as can be seen in signed languages (where new signs emerge from 
gestures), or on the basis of iconicity not between sound and meaning, 
but between the meanings of different expressions, as (computer) mouse. 
At the same time, with conventionalization, the role of iconicity 
diminishes — as again seen in signed languages, where ‘arbitrary’ signs 
are deemed to be at least as many as ‘iconic’ signs (Woll, Kyle 2004). 
Centuries of writing and language standardization in European lan-
guages would have further contributed to this, and language change 
provoked by language contact — perhaps even more. Many of the 
languages heavy on ideophones lack one or both of these characteristics: 
writing/standardization and extensive language contact. From this 
perspective, there is a ‘substratum’ of sound-symbolism in all languages, 
and the degree to which this is to be found may be due to factors such as 
those here suggested.12 This is clearly a hypothesis that would deserve 
further investigation.  
                                                 
12  Drawing from Ecuadorian Quechua, Nuckolls suggests another possible 
factor, namely that “ideophones thrive within animistic cultures” (Nuckolls 2004: 
132f). Her proposal is largely that people in animistic cultures use ideophones to 
relate to the surrounding world much more profoundly than in Western non-
animistic cultures: “I argue for a view of ideophones as a type of cultural 
discourse through which speakers align themselves with nonhuman life forms 
and forces of nature. This alignment is suggested by the special performative 
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5.2. The cognitive semiotic explication  
 
By utilizing a cognitive semiotic framework, and in particular Sones-
son’s (1997) notions of primary and secondary iconic signs, we believe 
to have clarified the phenomenon of sound symbolism even more. But 
here, as well, we were lead to a sort of dialectics. On the one hand, we 
agree with Sonesson that out of context, sound symbolism would 
appear to be a matter of secondary iconicity — since few could under-
stand the meaning of even the most transparent ideophone on first 
mention, without the help of context to “unlock its key”. But at least in 
some cases — in particular when provided with two contrastive 
expressions and two contrastive meanings — this secondary iconicity 
becomes the ground for understanding previously unknown signs, 
that is, becomes transformed, so to speak, into primary iconicity. 
This analysis helped us make sense of the successful results of 
studies of matching fictive words and visual figures, and of matching 
known and unknown antonyms, and also to interpret the reasons 
behind some of the unsuccessful ones. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
analysis vindicated one of the key notions of structuralism, the 
contrastive relation between linguistic signs. Just as meanings and 
sounds can be defined by what they are not, the key condition for 
‘unlocking’ the iconcity of fictive and real words (transforming it from 
secondary to primary, as formulated in the previous paragraph) seems 
to be to allow them to stand in a contrastive relationship, along a 
single semantic dimension, as shown in Figure 7.   
 
 
                                                                                                    
properties of ideophones, which collapse the distinction between a speech event 
and a narrated event, thus compelling a speaker to become an action, event, or 
process, in order to communicate about it” (Nuckolls 2004: 131, our emphases). 
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Figure 7. The dimension of SMOOTHNESS, with the two extreme ends ‘smooth’ 
and ‘sharp’, constituting the basis for matching visual and phonetic contrasts. 
 
 
This could explain why there is less primary iconicity, even with the 
help of context, in (spoken) language than what one could assume 
from the hypothesis laid out at the end of the previous subsection. Far 
from all words in a language can be placed on one or another 
dimension, as in Figure 7. Adjectives, or other expressions of quality, 
are most susceptible to this, whereas nouns like horse obviously much 
less so. Hence, the prediction would be that even if such a non-
gradable expression were initially strongly sound symbolic (iconic), 
this iconicity would not be preserved with conventionalization and 
historical change.  
Indeed, Hinton and colleagues list a number of features that are 
likely to be expressed by sound symbolic words, namely “salient 
characteristics of objects and activities, such as movement, size, shape, 
color, and texture” (Hinton et al. 1994: 10). Note that all of these are 
qualities that are more or less gradient, that is, can be placed on 
dimensions such as SPEED, SIZE, ROUNDNESS, SMOOTHNESS etc. 
Dingemanse points out that sound symbolic words typically involve 
characteristics that are discernable by the six senses (sight, touch, 
hearing, interoception, taste, smell), as well as emotion, and — as we 
would expect from our emphasis on cross-modality, combinations of 
these.13  
                                                 
13  Dingemanse, Mark ‘What do we really know about ideophones?’ Paper pre-
sented at the 6th World Congress of African Linguistics, August 21, 2009, Köln. 
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Typological studies such as these, however, have their limitations, 
since the processes in which the iconicity was established was some-
time in the (indefinite) past, and we have no way of knowing whether 
it is ‘alive’ enough in the minds of speakers, or only a historical relic. 
This led us, as many others since Sapir (1929) and Köhler (1929) to 
experimentation. 
 
 
5.3. Experiment 
 
We found it lacking, especially from a linguistic perspective, that 
previous experiments with fictive word matching to figures simply 
picked two expressions that seems to their authors to be ‘soft’ vs. ‘hard’ 
such as bouba and kiki. Hence, we chose our sound patterns carefully, 
on the basis of systematic contrasts between vowels and consonants. 
Thus, we could formulate the question, utilizing the semiotic termino-
logy introduced in Section 3: is it contrasts in vowels or in consonants 
that mostly lead to the perception of an iconic ground between sound 
patterns and figures? The dialectic answer was: both, and (most likely) 
their combination. Still, it was rather surprising that when consonants 
and vowels were combined ‘incongruently’ from a sound-symbolic 
perspective, there was a certain bias in the direction of the consonants. 
Perhaps this is not surprising, since it is the obstruent consonants that 
introduce the most salient contrast to all other segments, both the 
vowels and the sonorant consonants (see Figure 6). If we had instead 
used a less salient contrast for the consonants (for example, voiceless 
vs. voiceless obstruents) as the basis for a possible ground for 
matching to ‘sharper’ vs. ‘softer’ figures, the bias in favor of conso-
nants would probably have been diminished. Such studies are an 
obvious further extension of our research.  
Other extensions include the use of other dimensions such as SIZE 
(close vowels to small figures), and more challengingly, COLOR 
(different vowels are known to give rise to different colors in some 
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forms of synaesthesia, and the French poet, representative of the 
school of ‘symbolism’, Rimbaud (1986) claimed a particular mapping: 
“I invented the colors of vowels: A black, E white, I red, O blue, U 
green”. But as we pointed out, synaesthesia is both involuntary, and 
known to give rise to ‘arbitrary’ associations due to ‘cross-wiring’ 
between the senses, which can be more or less idiosyncratic. COLOR 
is not a single dimension but at least two dimensions: HUE and 
LIGHTNESS. Whereas we would predict intersubjective agreement in 
a task involving matching sounds to the LIGHTNESS dimension 
(open vowels — ‘dark’, close vowels — ‘light’) it is much less obvious 
what the ground would be for perceiving similarities between sounds 
and dimension of HUE (the colors of the rainbow). 
This discussion actualizes the point we made at end of Section 4: it 
is still not completely clear how the ground for cross-modal iconicity 
is perceived, that is, how we are able to establish similarities across 
different modalities. Figure 7 gives the impression that there is an 
abstract ‘amodal’ dimension, in this case of SMOOTHNESS, ‘between’ 
the senses of vision and sound, but this is doubtful, to say the least. We 
would prefer an account of step-by-step matching between senses, as 
suggested in the quotation from Ikegami and Zlatev (2007), but as 
admitted, this is still rather speculative. Cognitive semiotics, aided by 
neuroscience, would hopefully make progress in this direction with 
time. It is known that persons with lesions in the angular gyrus, 
known to be involved in cross-modal integration, have difficulties with 
performing the fictive words-to-figures matching task (Ramachandran, 
Hubbard 2001), and more recently it has also been strongly suggested 
that this also applies for people with autism (Oberman, Ra-
machandran, in press). 
Lastly, we should mention the factor of writing. In designing the 
experiment, we took two steps to minimize any potential role of 
written language: the sound forms were presented orally, and their 
order in the pairs randomized, as well as that of the figures, to avoid a 
possible bias from the left-to-right direction of writing. But we can 
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nevertheless not exclude that (Swedish) writing may have played at 
least some role in performing the task, 14  since spelling is not 
completely ‘arbitrary’ either. The letters in the Latin alphabet for 
voiceless obstruents are indeed quite ‘pointy’, for example, <k> and 
<t>. Similarly for the letter for the front close vowel <i>. On the other 
hand, back open vowels tend to be ‘round’, <o> and <u>. Of course, 
the mappings are not completely systematic, since English also uses 
the arguably smoother <c> and <q> for the sound [k], which most 
Romance languages use as their standard. Still, we have no guarantee 
that such secondary iconicity could not be ‘unlocked’ in some contexts. 
Indeed, Westbury found an “interaction between visual form and 
phonology” (Westbury 2005: 16) in two experiments using Latin 
characters. It would be interesting to compare our results, performed 
with Swedish speakers, with results from languages using a script that 
does not show similar differences. In Burmese writing, for example, 
nearly all letters contain a semicircle, see Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Table showing approximate representation of the sound sequences 
[bumo] and [kite] in different scripts. 
 
Script [bumo] [kite] 
Burmese   
Korean 부모 기데 
Gujarati બૂમો ખીથે 
Georgian ბუმო ქითე 
Hiragana ぶも きて 
                                                 
14  For example by visualizing the words spelled when hearing them. In one of 
the debriefing questions we asked whether the participants had done so. None 
reported to have done so, but… mysterious are the ways of the brain. 
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Another worthwhile comparison would be with children who have not 
yet learned the (Swedish) writing system. In a study of this sort, 
Maurer et al. (2006), found evidence for successful sound-figure 
matching even in pre-literate (English-speaking) toddlers, which is 
also what our cross-modal account would predict. But from what age 
the phenomenon appears still remains to be investigated. 
To conclude, we hope to have shown that our cognitive-semiotic 
approach to sound-symbolism, and the notion of cross-modal 
iconicity can contribute to going beyond the debate with ‘arbitrariness’, 
and to help focus the discussion not so much on the existence of the 
phenomenon, but on its nature. In doing so, we are bound to move 
towards a more balanced and thus more adequate account of human 
language, shaped through the dialectics of convention and iconicity.15 
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Межмодальная иконичность:  
когнитивно-семиотический подход к звуковому символизму 
 
Все яснее становится, что положение Соссюра об «арбитрарном ха-
рактере языкового знака» вступает в конфликт с широким рас-
пространением такого явления как «звуковой символизм». После 
обзора истории вопроса мы приходим к выводу о том,  что обе пози-
ции преувеличены и что удовлетворительного объяснения звукового 
символизма нет до сих пор. Как, например, можно ощутить сходство 
между выражением и содержанием в различных сенсорных модаль-
ностях? Наш ответ на этот вопрос опирается на понятие Пирса 
«основа иконичности» и на различение Г. Сонессоном первичной и 
вторичной иконичности. Далее мы описываем эмпирическое на-
правление исследований, первым пионером которого был В. Кэлер и 
которое недавно вновь ввел в обиход В. Рамачадран. В этом иссле-
дований мы варьировали гласные и согласные в выдуманных слово-
формах и пришли к выводу, что звуки обоих типов играют сущест-
венную роль в восприятии основы иконичности между словофор-
мами и визуальными образами. Комбинация исторического концеп-
туального анализа, семиотических объяснений и психологических 
экспериментов, как это представлено в настоящей статье, является 
основой создаваемой парадигмы когнитивной семиотики. 
 
 
Modaalsuste-vaheline ikoonilisus:  
kognitiivsemiootiline lähenemine häälikusümboolikale 
 
Üha enam on mõistetud, et Saussure’i seisukoht „keelemärgi arbitraarsest 
loomusest” on vastuolus „häälikusümboolika” nime all tuntud laialt levi-
nud fenomeniga. Pärast ülevaate esitamist selleteemalisest ajaloolisest 
debatist näitame, et mõlemad positsioonid on liialdatud ja rahuldav 
seletus häälikusümboolika nähtusele puudub jätkuvalt. Kuidas näiteks on 
võimalik tajuda sarnasust väljenduste ja sisu vahel erinevates sensoorsetes 
modaalsustes? Oma vastuses sellele küsimusele tugineme Peirce’i mõistele 
ikoonilisuse alus ja G. Sonessoni eristusele primaarse ja sekundaarse 
ikoonilisuse vahel. Lisaks sellele esitame oma empiirilist uurimust para-
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digmas, mille esimeseks teerajajaks oli W. Köhler ja mida hiljuti on 
populariseerinud V. Ramachandran. Selles uurimuses varieerisime vo-
kaale ja konsonante väljamõeldud sõnavormides ning jõudsime järeldu-
sele, et nii konsonandid kui vokaalid mängivad olulist rolli sõnavormide 
ja visuaalsete kujundite vahelise ikoonilisuse aluse tajumisel. Ajaloolise 
kontseptuaalse analüüsi, semiootiliste seletuste ja psühholoogiliste eks-
perimentide kombinatsioon, nagu see on esitatud käesolevas artiklis, on 
aluseks kujunevale kognitiivse semiootika paradigmale. 
